Difference between revisions of "Talk:GID Key"

From The iPhone Wiki
Jump to: navigation, search
(Vaumnou: new section)
m (moved from NCK page (correct here?))
Line 32: Line 32:
   
 
According to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Wikipedia], the known timing attacks for AES are *cache* timing attacks. This won't work if the hardware crypto engine has one-cycle read access to its ROM, and I know of no reason why it wouldn't.
 
According to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Wikipedia], the known timing attacks for AES are *cache* timing attacks. This won't work if the hardware crypto engine has one-cycle read access to its ROM, and I know of no reason why it wouldn't.
  +
  +
== side-channel attack ==
  +
Some super-smart guy should try that http://m.technologyreview.com/communications/39855/ --[[User:M2m|M2m]] 09:53, 12 March 2012 (MDT)

Revision as of 19:44, 12 March 2012

drg

Would this be vulnerable to a cold boot attack?

geohot

I really doubt the AES key is ever in memory. This is an attack against drive encryption, not hardware coprocessors. Fault analysis or timing would be our best bet.

Vaumnou

Unless you can cause read faults by browning out the chip or the ROM is external, you can't use fault analysis. And if the ROM is external, it would probably be easier to unsolder it and read it directly.

pumpkin

it isn't external

Vaumnou

Then the only way to do fault analysis would be to poke around on the chip directly. Is it known whether the die is face-down or face-up on the PCB?

ta

this sounds like a job for leet hacking super hero TA Mobile!

geohot

Hopefully the amount of time varies from encrypt to encrypt, although I believe most AES engines are fixed in time.

Browning out the chip is more what I was thinking. Probing the chip is far beyond my abilities, but I could brown the chip out for a clock cycle or two and determine where in the pipeline I am. I would need to know a lot more about the coprocessor design. It is standard? HDL model out there?

Vaumnou

According to Wikipedia, the known timing attacks for AES are *cache* timing attacks. This won't work if the hardware crypto engine has one-cycle read access to its ROM, and I know of no reason why it wouldn't.

side-channel attack

Some super-smart guy should try that http://m.technologyreview.com/communications/39855/ --M2m 09:53, 12 March 2012 (MDT)