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Difference between revisions of "HFS Legacy Volume Name Stack Buffer Overflow"
Awesomebing1 (talk | contribs) (Better formatting. If anyone could please seperate vm_prep and main, that would be awesome.) |
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int i = open("/dev/vn0", O_RDONLY, 0); |
int i = open("/dev/vn0", O_RDONLY, 0); |
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if(i < 0){ |
if(i < 0){ |
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− | puts("[-]Can't open /dev/vn0"); |
+ | puts("[-]Can't open /dev/vn0"); |
− | exit(1); |
+ | exit(1); |
} |
} |
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ioctl(i, VNIOCDETACH, &vn); |
ioctl(i, VNIOCDETACH, &vn); |
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Line 33: | Line 33: | ||
if(ioctl(i, VNIOCATTACH, &vn) < 0) |
if(ioctl(i, VNIOCATTACH, &vn) < 0) |
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{ |
{ |
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− | puts("[-]Coudn't attach to /dev/vn0")'' |
+ | puts("[-]Coudn't attach to /dev/vn0")'' |
− | close(i); |
+ | close(i); |
− | exit(1); |
+ | exit(1); |
− | } |
+ | } |
return close(1); |
return close(1); |
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} |
} |
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− | |||
int main(int argc, char const *argv[]) |
int main(int argc, char const *argv[]) |
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sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", 0, 0, &one, sizeof(uint32_t)); |
sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", 0, 0, &one, sizeof(uint32_t)); |
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patch_kernel(); |
patch_kernel(); |
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+ | return 0; |
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− | |||
− | + | } |
|
− | } |
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== Credit == |
== Credit == |
Latest revision as of 14:21, 28 March 2015
The HFS Legacy Volume Name Stack Buffer Overflow is a kernel vulnerability used to achieve an untethered jailbreak. Its exploit implementation, dubbed "feedface,"[1] was used in conjunction with limera1n's bootrom exploit or the usb_control_msg(0xA1, 1) Exploit in greenpois0n.
Exploiting the Kernel Bug
This stack buffer overflow relies on the hfs_mdb file in feedface, when the untether is ran it uses hfs_mdb to take control of PC register and do basically whatever you want, in that case, they used a function called real_payload() that patched the kernel and patched the sandbox. After some reverse engineering, here's what the untether looked like.
int mnt_our_hfs() { struct hfs_mount_args i; bzero(i, sizeof(i)); i.fspec = (int)"/dev/vn0"; i.hfs_uid = args.hfs_gid = 99; i.hfs_mask = 0x1C5; puts("[+]Triggering the kernel exploit"); mount("hfs", "mnt/", MNT_RDONLY, i); return puts("[+] Payload was successful"); }
int prep_vn() { vn_ioctl vn; int i = open("/dev/vn0", O_RDONLY, 0); if(i < 0){ puts("[-]Can't open /dev/vn0"); exit(1); } ioctl(i, VNIOCDETACH, &vn); vn.vn_file = (int)"/usr/lib/hfs_mdb"; vn.vn_control = vncontrol_readwrite_io_e; if(ioctl(i, VNIOCATTACH, &vn) < 0) { puts("[-]Coudn't attach to /dev/vn0") close(i); exit(1); } return close(1); } int main(int argc, char const *argv[]) { int result; struct stat i; uint32_t zero = 0, one = 1; sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", 0, 0, &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)); sysctlbyname("vm.cs_validation", 0, 0, &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)) prep_vn(); i.st_uid = 0; i.st_gid = 0; i.st_rdev = 0; i.st_atimespec.tv_nsec = 0; i.st_atimespec.tv_sec = 0; i.st_mtimespec.tv_nsec = 0; i.st_mtimespec.tv_sec = 0; i.st_ctimespec.tv_sec = 0; i.st_dev = (dev_t)"/dev/vn0"; i.st_ino = 99; i.st_uid = 453; puts("[+]Trigger kernel exploit"); mnt_our_hfs(); sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", 0, 0, &one, sizeof(uint32_t)); patch_kernel(); return 0; }
Credit
Sources for information
- TwitLonger
- http://pastie.org/2060071 (from a tweet by jan0)
- BlackHat Presentation by I0n1c (starting at slide 24)